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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

C&M INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD., and
KARLIN HOLDINGS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Respondent,
NEIL DAYID CAMPBELL, individually,
Defendant/Respondent/Appellant
and
PHILIP RICHARD POWERS, individually;
POWERS INVESTMENTS AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., S.A., a
corporation; GUANANA GRIS, S.A., a
corporation; PROTECCION FORESTAL
DE TECA, S.S., A corporation; and DOES 1
through 50 inclusive,
Defendants.
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SUPREME COURT NO. 44719

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the
County of Blaine.
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge, Presiding.

Neil David Campbell
P.O. Box 3372
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-309-3705

Pro Se for Defendant/Respondent/
Appellant

Erin Clark
P.O.Box3310
Ketchum, ID 83340
Telephone: 208-725-0055
Fax: 208-725-0076
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners
/Respondents
C&M Investment Group and
Karlin Holdings LP
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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case addressed a contempt of court case involving IO counts of civil contempt of
court and 24 counts of criminal contempt of court. (R., p. 29 through 49 of 636) C&M
Investment Group, LTD., (hereinafter "C&M") and Karlin Holdings Limited Partnership
(hereinafter "Karlin") pursued the counts of civil contempt of court and criminal contempt of
court against Neil Campbell (hereinafter "Campbell"). The criminal contempt of court counts
commenced due to a debtor's examination taken on August 24, 2015 in Blaine County, Idaho.
That exam sought information which may have assisted in the collection of part of a
domesticated foreign (California) judgment. (R., p. 14 through 20 of 636, and p. 33 of 636, ii
12).
C&M and Karlin dismissed 8 of the IO counts of contempt of court seeking a civil
sanction during their closing argument giving at trial. The only remaining civil contempt of court
cases were counts I and 8. (R., p. 488 of 636) Campbell was given a civil sanction by the Court
relating to counts I and 8 at the sentencing hearing. (R., p. 603 and 604 of 636) The two civil
contempt of court charges have been purged and are not at issue in this appeal.
On Febrnary 22, 2016 Campbell signed an Advisement of Rights Regarding Contempt
document. (R., p. 150 and 151 of636) The Advisement of Rights Regarding Contempt form
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2
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provided Campbell with the following information. "RIGHTS The purpose of the initial
appearance is to advise you of both the charge(s) against you and your rights. You are advised
that: ... You have the right to remain silent (often called the privilege against selfincrimination). You are not required to make a statement and any statement you make can be
used as evidence against you at trial. 75(f)(l)(c) ... If you choose to admit you are in contempt
of the court's order, you waive your right to silence. (R., p. 150 of 636) Campbell signed the
Advisement of Rights Regarding Contempt on February 22, 2016 and acknowledged that "I have
read this entire document and I understand it." (R., p. 151 of636)
On June 1, 2016 the Order Regarding Appointment was entered by the Court which
appointed Lee Ritzau as the attorney for Neil Campbell, the Respondent. Prior to June I, 2016
Neil represented himself. Mr. Ritzau had just under two months to prepare for trial.
On July 26, 2016 the Court Trial involving IO counts of civil contempt of court and 24
counts of criminal contempt of court commenced. (Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 10, L. 1- 13).
This contempt of court trial was held over two days, July 26 and 27, 2016. (Tr. Vol. I of
II, p. 3, L. 3 and p. 4, L. 3). Petitioners pursued the IO counts of contempt of court seeking a
civil sanction and 24 counts of contempt of court seeking a criminal sanction which are set forth
in the Charging Affidavit. The parties and court frequently refen-ed to the IO counts of contempt
seeking a civil sanction as civil contempt of court and the 24 counts of contempt of court seeking
a criminal sanction as criminal contempt of court.
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During the contempt of court trial, C&M and Karlin sought to call Campbell to the
witness stand. (Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 132, L. 11).
Mr. Ritzau objected to C&M and Karlin's attempt to call Campbell to the witness stand
and stated as follows:
"MR. RITZAU: Judge, I object on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment right; Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution; Idaho Code Section 19-3003. Mr. Campbell, under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2), he has the right to remain silent." (Tr, Vol. I of II, p. 132, L.
12- 16).
Mr. Ritzau further stated,
"MR. RITZAU: Judge, then we can go to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2).
THE COURT: 75(i)(2)7
MR. RITZAU: Correct.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. RITZAU: 'Trial rights required to impose a criminal sanction. The court cannot
impose a criminal sanction following a trial unless the respondent was provided the following
rights:'
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me get there. 75(i)(2). Okay.
MR. RITZAU: (D) the privilege against self-incrimination.
THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Campbell has the privilege against self-incrimination on
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any criminal sanction sought to be imposed. And, ordinarily, in a ctiminal case that precludes
the prosecutor from calling the defendant as a witness for any reason, if it's purely a criminal
case. I mean, I've never seen one where the prosecutor - - or seen a criminal.case where the
prosecutor sought to call the defendant to testify even to ask him his name or to ask him where he
lives or something that might.be privileged. I think the defendant in a criminal case ordinarily
has a right not to testify at all. And I recognize what the rules says, the Court cannot impose a
criminal sanction following trial unless the defendant was afforded the privilege against selfincrimination." ( Emphasis Added) (Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 133, L. 15 - p. 134, L. 16).
The Court required Campbell to take the stand and testify. (Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 160, L. 1 I 13),
The Count found Campbell guilty of criminal contempt of court on counts 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 31, and 32. (R., p. 542 of636)
The Court ordered Campbell to serve 65 days in the Blaine County Jail on the 13 counts
of criminal contempt upon which the Court found him guilty. (R., p. 603 of 636).
IV.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I

1. Whether the District Court erred in imposing a Criminal Sanction without honoring
Appellant's privilege against self-incrimination as provided by IRCP 75(i)(2)(D) and Camp v.
East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd..

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5
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v.
ARGUMENT

1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A CRIMINAL SANCTION
AGAINST CAMPBELL AS IT FAILED TO HONOR HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION.
A. FACTS RELATING TO THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION ISSUE PROVIDED IN IRCP 75(i)(2)(D),
Mr. Ritzau stated as follows:
"MR. RITZAU: Judge, I object on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment right; Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution; Idaho Code Section 19-3003. Mr. Campbell, under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2), he has the right to remain silent." (Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 132, L.
12- 16).
"MR. RITZAU: Judge, then we can go to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2).
THE COURT: 75(i)(2)?
MR. RITZA U: CoJTect.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. RITZAU: 'Trial rights required to impose a criminal sanction. The court cannot
impose a criminal sanction following a trial unless the respondent was provided the following
lights:'
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me get there. 75(i)(2). Okay.
MR. RITZAU: (D) the privilege against self-incrimination.
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THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Campbell has the privilege against self-incrimination on
any criminal sanction songht to be imposed. And, ordinarily, in a criminal case that precludes
the prosecutor from calling the defendant as a witness for any reason, if it's purely a criminal
case. I mean, I've never seen one where the prosecutor - - or seen a criminal case where the
prosecutor sought to call the defendant to testify even to ask him his name or to ask him where he
lives or something that might be p1ivileged. I think the defendant in a criminal case ordinarily
has a right not to testify at all. And I recognize what the rules says, the Court cannot impose a
criminal sanction following trial unless the defendant was afforded the privilege against selfincrimination." (Tr. Vol. I ofll, p. 133, L. 15 - p. 134, L. 16).
Over Campbell's objections, the Court permitted C&M and Karlin to call Campbell. "So,
what I'm going to go with is he can be called as a witness as long as - - and he can be asked
about the civil contempt issues. I think - - like I say, I think that there's a fairly clear demarcation
in this case between the civil and criminal contempt issues. I think he can be asked about the
civil contempt issues. He can probably take the Fifth Amendment depending on what questions
are asked, but a negative inference can be drawn. In other words, it can't be used - - and it can't
be used to support an argument that I couldn't comply. That's an affinnative defense." (Tr. Vol.
I ofll, p. 149, L. 15- 25).
Mr. Ritzau responded to the Court's rnling and stated,
"MR. RITZAU: I agree with that burden, Judge, but I'm going to object, and I just want

I
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to do some things to clarify the record.
This is a combined proceeding, so there are IO counts of civil contempt and 24 counts of
civil - - or of criminal contempt, pardon me.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. RITZAU: Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(i)(2), Mr. Campbell has the right
to remain silent for the climinal sanctions.
THE COURT: Absolutely. (Tr. Vol. I of II, p. 150, L. 1- 11).

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
"We exercise free review over the issues oflaw decided by the district court to dete1mine
whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law." State ofIdaho Department ofHealth
and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274,276 (2013)

"This Court exercises free review over questions regarding the interpretation of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure." Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,
294 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2013).
"We freely review the district court's conclusions of law." Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154
Idaho 27, 3 I (2013).
"Idaho Appellate Rule I !(a)(4) allows a direct appeal from an order of contempt. Thus,
we review an appeal from an order of contempt the same as any other appeal' .... We review
the sanction imposed upon a finding of contempt for an abuse of discretion." Carr v. Pridgen,
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157 Idaho 238,242 (2014).
"To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court asks: (1)
Whether the trial court correctly perceived this issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Duspiva v. Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27, 35 (2013).

C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A CRIMINAL
SANCTION OF 65 DAYS IN THE BLAINE COUNTY JAIL AFTER IT REFUSED TO
HONOR CAMPBELL'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
The District Court erred in imposing a Criminal Sanction of 65 days in the Blaine County
Jail without providing Campbell his right against self-incrimination provided for in IRCP
75(i)(2)(D) and Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co. Ltd.
"The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is important because of the federal
'

constitutional rights that the United States Supreme Court has held applicable in nonsummary
criminal contempt proceedings. Those rights include notice that a criminal contempt sanction is
being sought in the contempt proceedings, ... ; the 1ight to a public trial, ... ; the right to
compulso1y process, ... ; the right to the presumption of innocence, ... ; the privilege against
self-incrimination, ... ; the requirement that contempt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, ... ;
the right to be represented by counsel, ... ; the right to cross-examine witnesses, ... ; the right to
call witnesses to testify both in complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in

I
I
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mitigation of the penalty to be imposed, ... ; the right to testify in one's own behalf, ... ; the right
to the protection of the exclusionary rule, ... ; the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause, ... ;
and the right to speak on one's own behalf, similar to the right to allocution, in order to present
matters in mitigation or otherwise attempt to make amends with the court, ... ; As stated by the
United States Supreme Court ... 'Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense,' ... and
'criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections
that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings."' Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd.,
137 Idaho 850, 860 & 861 (2002).

It appears as if this case was the precursor to much ofIRCP 75.
IRCP 75(i)(2) sets forth the rights required to impose a Criminal Sanction and states, "(i)
Nonsummary Proceedings; Trial. .. . (2) Trial Rights Required to Impose a Criminal Sanction.

The court cannot impose a criminal sanction following a trial unless the respondent was provided
the following rights: (A) a public trial, (B) compulsory process, (C) the presumption of
innocence, (D) the privilege against self-incrimination, (E) the right to call and cross-examine
witnesses, (F) the right to testify in his or her own behalf, (G) the right to exclude evidence that
was obtained in violation of the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, (H) the right to counsel,
if applicable, and (I) the right to a unanimous verdict ifthere was a jury trial." IRCP 75(i)(2).
"[I]f both civil and criminal relief are imposed in the same proceeding, then the 'criminal
feature of the order is dominant and fixes its character for purposes of review.' ... A court can
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impose a criminal contempt sanction in nonsummary contempt proceedings only if the
contemnor has been afforded the federal constitutional rights applicable to c1iminal contempt of
court." State ofIdaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 277.
"The Constitutional rights applicable to criminal contempt are substantially greater than
those applicable to civil contempt. Camp, 137 ID at 860-861, 55 P.3d 314-315. In some cases
the court could impose either a criminal contempt penalty or a civil contempt penalty, but if the
contemnor is not granted the rights applicable to criminal contempt, the judge cannot impose a
criminal contempt sanction. ID at 86 I, 5 5 at 315. Thus the rights granted to the contemn or
before and dming the hearing can detennine the type of sanction (criminal or civil) that can be
imposed at the end of the Hearing." CONTEMPT, Hon. Daniel T Eismann, 2016 Edition, Page
12.

"If a contemnor is not granted the constitutional rights applicable to criminal contempt,
then the judge cannot impose a criminal sanction. '[C]riminal penalties may not be imposed on
someone who has not been afforded the protections that the constitution requires of such criminal
proceedings, ... Hicks on Behalf ofFeiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988)'" CONTEMPT,
Hon. Daniel T Eismann, 2016 Edition, Pages 12 & 13.
The District Court erred when it imposed a Criminal Sanction against Campbell as
Campbell's privilege against self-incrimination/his right to not take the witness stand was not
honored. The District Court made Campbell take the stand and answer questions posed by C&M
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and Karlin' s counsel. Once Campbell was forced to take the stand the District Coutino longer
had the ability to impose a Criminal Sanction against him. Under the language of ICRP
75(i)(2)(D) and its associated free standard ofreview, the District Court could not impose a
criminal sanction in this case. Under Camp v. East Fork Ditch Company and its associated abuse
of discretion standard of review, the District Comi' s imposition of a criminal sanction was
improper as the imposition of a criminal sanction without providing Campbell his right against
self-incrimination was inconsistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to the District Court pursuant to IRCP 75(i)(2)(D) and/or Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co.,
Ltd. and State ofidaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Slane.
VI.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Campbell asks the Court to vacate the District Court's decision
imposing a Criminal Sanction of65 days in jail. Since Campbell was not provided his right
against self-incrimination, a Criminal Sanction can not be imposed in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

_J__ day of January, 2018.

NEIL DAYID CAMPBELL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_£_ day of January, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the following attorneys for Appellant:
Erin Clark
Lawson, Laski, Clark & Pogue, PLLC
PO Box 3310
Ketchum, ID 83340
Fax: 208-725-0076
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid.

~By depositing copies of the same with Federal Ex
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ss for overnight delivery.

